Consciousness revisited : materialism without phenomenal concepts / Michael Tye.
Material type:
TextSeries: Representation and mind seriesPublication details: Cambridge, MA : MIT Press, 2009.Description: 229 pISBN: - 9780262012737
- B808.9 T979 C 2009
English Books
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English Books
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MATRIX Library General Eng/FL.3 | General Books | B808.9 T979 C 2009 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | C.1 | Available | 1000375518 |
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| B808.67 F911 A 2003 Autonomy, gender, politics / | B808.9 R655 U 2004 Understanding phenomenal consciousness / | B808.9 S894 M 2010 Mental reality / | B808.9 T979 C 2009 Consciousness revisited : | materialism without phenomenal concepts / | B821 W853 W 2010 What is posthumanism? / | B828 B362 W 2012 When words are called for : | a defense of ordinary language philosophy / | B828 C973 G 2002 Genealogy of nihilism : | philosophies of nothing and the difference of theology / |
"A Bradford book."
Introduction -- Phenomenal consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation -- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness -- Consciousness of things -- Real world puzzle cases -- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be -- What is the thesis of physicalism? -- Why consciousness cannot be physical -- Why consciousness must be physical -- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Some terminological points -- Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Various accounts of phenomenal concepts -- My own earlier view on phenomenal concepts -- Are there any phenomenal concepts? -- Phenomenal concepts and burgean intuitions -- Consequences for a priori physicalism -- The admissible contents of visual experience : the existential thesis -- The singular (when filled) thesis -- Kaplanianism -- The multiple contents thesis -- The existential thesis revisited -- Still more on existential contents -- Consciousness, seeing and knowing -- Knowing things and knowing facts -- Nonconceptual content -- Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational properties -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part I -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part II -- Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it -- Solving the puzzles -- Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow? -- The explanatory gap -- The hard problem -- The possibility of zombies -- Change blindness and the refrigerator light illusion -- A closer look at the change blindness hypotheses -- The no-seeum view -- Sperling and the refrigerator light -- Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility -- A further change blindness experiment -- Another brick in the wall -- Privileged access, phenomenal character, and externalism -- The threat to privileged access -- A Burgean thought experiment -- Social externalism for phenomenal character? -- A closer look at privileged access and incorrigibility -- How do I know that I am not a zombie? -- Phenomenal externalism.
HKBU library
YT2025 M10
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