02026cam a2200265 a 4500 110228s2011 enka b 001 0 eng 9781107004368 9780521179461 SDU HD30.23 V888 M 2011 Vohra, Rakesh V. 210805 Mechanism design : a linear programming approach / Rakesh V. Vohra. Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2011. 172 p. : ill. Econometric Society monographs ; 47 Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction; 2. Arrow's theorem and its consequences; 3. Network flow problem; 4. Incentive compatibility; 5. Efficiency; 6. Revenue maximization; 7. Rationalizability. HKBU library YT2025 M08 "Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design"-- Decision making Linear programming. 210806 Organizational behavior Mathematical models. 210807 Machine theory. = C.1 SDU GBE lcc 109352 109352 0 0 lcc 0 HD003023 V888 M2011 0 CGB 278672 SDU SDU GEN3 2025-08-21 2 0 HD30.23 V888 M 2011 1000385869 2025-08-21 00:00:00 C.1 2025-08-21 GBE