Mathematics and democracy : designing better voting and fair-division procedures /
Steven J. Brams.
- Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 2008.
- 373 p.
Electing a single winner : approval voting in practice -- Electing a single winner : approval voting in theory -- Electing a single winner : combining approval and preference -- Electing multiple winners : constrained approval voting -- Electing multiple winners : the minimax procedure -- Electing multiple winners : minimizing misrepresentation -- Selecting winners in multiple elections -- Selecting a governing coalition in a parliament -- Allocating cabinet ministries in a parliament -- Allocating indivisible goods : help the worst-off or avoid envy? -- Allocating a single homogeneous divisible good : divide-the-dollar -- Allocating multiple homogeneous divisible goods : adjusted winner -- Allocating a single heterogeneous good : cutting a cake -- Allocating divisible and indivisible goods -- Summary and conclusions. HKBU library