Brams, Steven J.

Mathematics and democracy : designing better voting and fair-division procedures / Steven J. Brams. - Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 2008. - 373 p.

Electing a single winner : approval voting in practice -- Electing a single winner : approval voting in theory -- Electing a single winner : combining approval and preference -- Electing multiple winners : constrained approval voting -- Electing multiple winners : the minimax procedure -- Electing multiple winners : minimizing misrepresentation -- Selecting winners in multiple elections -- Selecting a governing coalition in a parliament -- Allocating cabinet ministries in a parliament -- Allocating indivisible goods : help the worst-off or avoid envy? -- Allocating a single homogeneous divisible good : divide-the-dollar -- Allocating multiple homogeneous divisible goods : adjusted winner -- Allocating a single heterogeneous good : cutting a cake -- Allocating divisible and indivisible goods -- Summary and conclusions. HKBU library

YT2025 M09

9780691133218 0691133212


Voting--Mathematical models.
Elections--Mathematical models.
Finance, Public--Mathematical models.

JF1001 / B815 M 2008