designing better voting and fair-division procedures Brams, Steven J. creator text bibliography nju Princeton, N.J Princeton University Press 2008 monographic eng

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373 p. Electing a single winner : approval voting in practice -- Electing a single winner : approval voting in theory -- Electing a single winner : combining approval and preference -- Electing multiple winners : constrained approval voting -- Electing multiple winners : the minimax procedure -- Electing multiple winners : minimizing misrepresentation -- Selecting winners in multiple elections -- Selecting a governing coalition in a parliament -- Allocating cabinet ministries in a parliament -- Allocating indivisible goods : help the worst-off or avoid envy? -- Allocating a single homogeneous divisible good : divide-the-dollar -- Allocating multiple homogeneous divisible goods : adjusted winner -- Allocating a single heterogeneous good : cutting a cake -- Allocating divisible and indivisible goods -- Summary and conclusions. HKBU library Steven J. Brams. YT2025 M09 Voting Mathematical models Elections Mathematical models Finance, Public Mathematical models JF1001 B815 M 2008 9780691133218 0691133212 SDU 070606