000			02026cam a2200265 a 4500
008			110228s2011 enka b 001 0 eng
020			_a9781107004368
020			_a9780521179461
040			_aSDU
050	0	0	_aHD30.23 _bV888 M 2011
100	1		_aVohra, Rakesh V. _9210805
245	1	0	_aMechanism design : _ba linear programming approach / _cRakesh V. Vohra.
260			_aCambridge ; _aNew York : _bCambridge University Press, _c2011.
300			_a172 p. : _bill.
490	0		_aEconometric Society monographs ; _v47
505	8		_aMachine generated contents note: 1. Introduction; 2. Arrow's theorem and its consequences; 3. Network flow problem; 4. Incentive compatibility; 5. Efficiency; 6. Revenue maximization; 7. Rationalizability.
505	8		_aHKBU library
518			_aYT2025 M08
520			_a"Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design"--
650		0	_aDecision making _xLinear programming. _9210806
650		0	_aOrganizational behavior _xMathematical models. _9210807
650		0	_aMachine theory.
900			_a= C.1 SDU
942			_cGBE _2lcc
999			_c109352 _d109352