000			01644cam a2200241 a 4500
008			070606s2008 nju b 001 0 eng
020			_a9780691133218
020			_a0691133212
040			_aSDU
050	0	0	_aJF1001 _bB815 M 2008
100	1		_aBrams, Steven J. _9216101
245	1	0	_aMathematics and democracy : _bdesigning better voting and fair-division procedures / _cSteven J. Brams.
260			_aPrinceton, N.J. : _bPrinceton University Press, _c2008.
300			_a373 p.
505	0		_aElecting a single winner : approval voting in practice -- Electing a single winner : approval voting in theory -- Electing a single winner : combining approval and preference -- Electing multiple winners : constrained approval voting -- Electing multiple winners : the minimax procedure -- Electing multiple winners : minimizing misrepresentation -- Selecting winners in multiple elections -- Selecting a governing coalition in a parliament -- Allocating cabinet ministries in a parliament -- Allocating indivisible goods : help the worst-off or avoid envy? -- Allocating a single homogeneous divisible good : divide-the-dollar -- Allocating multiple homogeneous divisible goods : adjusted winner -- Allocating a single heterogeneous good : cutting a cake -- Allocating divisible and indivisible goods -- Summary and conclusions.
505	0		_aHKBU library
518			_aYT2025 M09
650		0	_aVoting _xMathematical models. _9216102
650		0	_aElections _xMathematical models. _9216103
650		0	_aFinance, Public _xMathematical models. _9216104
900			_a33030 = C.1 บัณฑิตวิทยาลัย
942			_cGBE _2lcc
999			_c111170 _d111170