000			02162nam a2200253 i 4500
008			170619s2013 xx eng d
020			_a9814417394
020			_a9789814417396
040			_aSDU
050	0	0	_aQA272.4 _bM478 V 2013
100	1		_aMcCain, Roger A. _9128694
245	1	0	_aValue solutions in cooperative games _cRoger A. McCain.
260			_a[S.l.] : _bWorld Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., _c2013.
300			_a236 p.
505	0		_aValue solutions in cooperative games -- Foreword -- Contents -- Chapter 1: Value Solutions for Superadditive Transferable Utility Games in Coalition Function Form -- Chapter 2: Zeuthen–Nash Bargaining -- Chapter 3: Nontransferable Utility Games and Games in Partition Function Form -- Chapter 4: A Shapley Value Algorithm for Games in Partition Function Form -- Chapter 5: Extension of the Nucleolus to Nontransferable Utility Games in Partition Function Form -- Chapter 6: A Core Imputation with Variable Bargaining Power -- Chapter 7: Bargaining Power Biform Games -- Chapter 8: Intertemporal Cooperative Games: A Sketch of a Theory -- Chapter 9: A Theory of Enterprise -- References -- Index.
505	0		_aHKBU library
518			_aYT2025 M08
520	3		_aThis book introduces new concepts for cooperative game theory, and particularly solutions that determine the distribution of a coalitional surplus among the members of the coalition. It also addresses several generalizations of cooperative game theory. Drawing on methods of welfare economics, new value solutions are derived for Non-Transferable Utility games with and without differences of bargaining power among the members of the coalition. Cooperation in intertemporal games is examined, and conditions that permit the reduction of these games to games in coalition function form are outlined. Biform games and games that combine non-cooperative search and matching of coalition members with cooperative solutions (i.e., efficient contracts) within the coalition are considered.
650		0	_aCooperative games (Mathematics) _9159549
650		0	_aGame theory
650		0	_aValues
900			_a= C.1 SDU
942			_cGBE _2lcc
999			_c89140 _d89140